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NOTE
Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH: The Long-
Arm Statute as a Protectionist Device*
INTRODUCTION
Technological and economic progress have continually fostered
the development of international trade. As greater quantities of inter-
national goods enter American markets, there is a greater potential that
American consumers will bring actions against international manufac-
turers for injuries sustained from defective products. Consequently,
state and federal courts must consider the constitutional restrictions in-
volved in asserting personal jurisdiction over alien' as well as over for-
eign2 defendants. One hundred years ago, a state's jurisdictional power
was virtually limited to its territorial boundaries.3 State and federal
courts, however, began to abandon this restrictive jurisdictional ap-
proach as interstate commerce developed.4 In the seminal case of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 the Supreme Court expanded a
state's jurisdictional authority by holding that a nonresident defendant
could be served with process if he sustained "minimum contacts" with
the forum.6 After the Supreme Court announced this flexible mini-
mum contacts standard, state legislators passed long-arm statutes which
enabled state and federal courts to establish personal jurisdiction over
* Winner, 1982 Lowden-Wigmore Prize. Northwestern University School of Law annually
awards the Lowden-Wigmore Prize to the best student contribution to each of its legal
publications.
I As used in this note, the term "alien" refers to an international corporate defendant.
2 As used in this note, the term "foreign" refers to an out-of-state corporate defendant.
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1878).
4 See infra note 57.
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6 Id. at 316.
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nonresident defendants.7 Generally, these statutory provisions permit
constructive service over nonresident defendants who conduct business
or who commit other acts within the state. Thus, if a nonresident de-
fendant's contact falls within the constitutional scope of the state's
long-arm statute, an injured plaintiff may seek redress in a court within
his state.8
Recently, the Supreme Court modified the flexible minimum con-
tacts standard enunciated in International Shoe. In World- Wide Volks-
wagen v. Woodson,9 the Supreme Court held that the minimum
contacts inquiry must focus upon whether the defendant had purpose-
fully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the fo-
rum state. The Court emphasized that the defendant could then
reasonably have anticipated litigating in that forum. State and federal
courts have generally followed the Volkswagen standard when deter-
mining the constitutionality of asserting personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants.
Some courts, however, have concluded that jurisdictional require-
ments should be relaxed when evaluating whether an alien defendant
sustained sufficient contact with a forum. In Poyner v. Erma Werke
GmbH, ° the Sixth Circuit adopted this more relaxed jurisdictional
standard and upheld personal jurisdiction over a German corporation
which had no direct contact with Kentucky. This note first will ex-
amine personal jurisdiction theory as it has been applied in the United
States and contend that the Sixth Circuit should have applied the
Volkswagen standard to determine whether defendant Erma's indirect
contact with Kentucky met due process requirements. Secondly, this
note will evaluate arguments in favor of applying a more liberal "mini-
mum contacts" formula to alien defendants, and argue that there is no
reasonable basis for relaxing jurisdictional requirements when the de-
fendant is an alien corporation. Finally, this note will discuss the im-
plications of discriminating against alien defendants and conclude that
the economic and political disadvantages of applying a more liberal
construction of the minimum contacts formula to alien defendants
clearly outweigh any jurisdictional advantages.
7 Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes state legislatures to enact long-
arm statutes. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Many of the statutes are modeled after § 103 of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act.
8 See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9 Id.
10 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
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BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Joseph Poyner, a Kentucky resident, filed a products
liability action against the defendant, Erma Werke GmbH (Erma), one
of Erma's distributors (L.A.), and Erma's insurer"I (Insurance Com-
pany of North America-INA) based on negligence and breach of war-
ranty in the manufacture of a .22 caliber, semi-automatic pistol. Erma
is a wholly owned German subsidiary of an American firm, Lear Sie-
gler Industries (LSI).1z In the business of manufacturing firearms, in-
cluding .22 caliber semi-automatic pistols,'3 Erma has no assets or
offices in the United States' 4 and conducts no business outside of Ger-
many. Its products are sold to German and American distributors who
market the pistols in Germany and the United States.' 5
I I At the time of Poyner's accident, INA provided Erma with liability insurance. INA is an
American insurance company which operates a branch office in Germany. In its brief, defendant
INA stressed that it had decided to terminate Erma's insurance coverage since "Erma had failed
to notify INA of Poyner's claim, and had allowed limitations to intervene as a bar to a claim for
coverage." Brief for Appellee, Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
12 Poyner joined Lear Siegler Industries as a defendant in an earlier action against Erma and
one of its distributors, L.A. In Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977), the Sixth Circuit ruled that LSI was not liable for Poyner's damages.
13 For many years, Erma has manufactured .22 caliber semi-automatic pistols. Erma admit-
ted it supplied the pistol to a German distributor, Wischo KG, on August 8, 1965. In an interro-
gatory, LSI stated that according to its information and belief "at some previous time L.A.
Distributors was a customer of Wischo KG." Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip
op. at 4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
14 Id. at 3.
15 The district court emphasized that L.A. was Erma's exclusive distributor in the United
States. As a result, the district court concluded that Erma should not be held liable for Poyner's
injuries since all profits made from the sale of Erma's products in the United States accrued to
L.A. Erma's lack of control over L.A. is critical to due process analysis. Although the courts are
not in accord on this issue, some jurisdictions held that a distributor's act should not be imputed to
an alien or foreign wholesaler defendant absent that wholesaler's control over the distribution.
See, e.g., Marston v. Gant, 357 F. Supp. 1122, 1123 (E.D. Va. 1972) (court dismissed a patent
infringement action, asserting that jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant did not appear
to control the distributor's activities, and did not partly own the distributor's stock). In the context
of a parent corporation and its subsidiary, see Velandra v. Regie Nationale Del Usines Renault,
336 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1964) (court rejected the argument that it was justifiable to impute the
subsidiary's contact to the parent for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over the parent corpora-
tion). But c. Blum v. Kawagachi, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 216 (D. Neb. 1971) (court upheld jurisdiction
over the defendant even though the defendant did not have any agents marketing his product in
the forum, and the sale to the plaintiff was made through an intermediate entity); Thornton v.
Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476, 482 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (court found that the
defendant had derived "substantial revenue by placing its products in channels of international
commerce [knowing] full well that normal product migration through the distribution chain will
inevitably bring a signffcant number of its automobiles to . . . Georgia"); and VanEeuwen v.
Heidleberg E., Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (1973) (court observed that although the
distributor may not be the manufacturer's agent in the legal sense, he is in the practical sense).
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On February 28, 1968, Poyner was injured in Kentucky as a result
of the negligent firing of a defective pistol manufactured by Erma. 6
According to records, Erma sold the pistol to a German exporter, Wis-
cho KG. 17 No evidence was presented as to the manner in which L.A.
acquired the pistol.' 8 Erma's records revealed, however, that L.A. sold
the gun to Stewart Bear of Nashville, Tennessee, 9 whom L.A. em-
ployed on a commission basis.2" The sale to Bear was the last recorded
transaction of the firearm. At the time of Poyner's injury, Lee Dyer of
Paducah, Kentucky owned the pistol.2
In July, 1969, Poyner filed suit against Erma and L.A. under the
Kentucky Long-Arm Statute.22 Based on LSI's advice, Erma failed to
answer the complaint.23 Erma also refused to provide INA with timely
notice of the action.24 Consequently, a default judgment of $398,830.77
16 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1187. Poyner is now a paraplegic.
17 This transaction occurred in Germany on August 8, 1965. Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH,
No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 6 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
18 See supra note 13.
19 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1191.
20 Id.
21 Id. In its brief in Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., the defendant stated that Lee Dyer's son-in-
law ultimately purchased the gun. Poyner was injured when he and a minor, Robert Dyer, were
playing with the gun. Brief for Appellant at 6, Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
22 Section two of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
4. Causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this commonwealth, provided that the tortious injury occuring in this common-
wealth arises out of the doing or soliciting of business or a persistent course of conduct or
derivation of substantial revenue within the commonwealth;
5. Causing injury in this commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty expressly
or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this commonwealth when the seller knew such
person would use, consume, or be affected by, the goods in this commonwealth, if he also
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
commonwealth.
KY. REV. STAT. § 454.210(2)(a)(4)-(5) (1970).
23 In Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 1981-P, slip op. (W.D. Ky. May 1, 1975), the district
court found that correspondence between LSI and Erma disclosed that LSI was responsible for
Erma's default. Id. at 8. An executive at LSI informed Erma's management that:
It is our strategy to, first, help the attorney for the L.A. Distributors Insurance prove that the
Erma pistol was not at fault. In this way we can contest the facts in the case without putting
Erma into the court's jurisdiction. That is, they must still sue Erma in Germany no matter
what the outcome. Second, that LSI is not directly involved in this case.
Brief for Appellee at 9, Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 969 (1977).
24 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1187.
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was entered against Erma.2" In July of 1973, Poyner filed a supplemen-
tal complaint against LSI, seeking to recover the judgment obtained
against Erma. 6 In an unpublished opinion, the district court held LSI
liable for the default judgment.27 On the basis of LSI's control over
Erma,28 the district court ruled that, for the purpose of this suit, LSI
and Erma should be considered one legal entity. 9 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed.30 The court rejected Poyner's contention that the ar-
rangement between LSI and Erma was a "fraudulent avoidance of ju-
risdiction,"'" because the plaintiff had not shown that Erma had
defended itself in forums in the United States or subjected its assets to
the jurisdiction of American courts prior to its acquisition by LSI.
32
Further, since Erma's operations had not been altered materially subse-
quent to its purchase by LSI, the court refused to hold LSI liable for
the default judgment entered against Erma.33
As a result of that decision, INA filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, alleging that there was no valid claim against INA because the
Kentucky courts lacked jurisdiction over Erma.34 On September 7,
1977, the district court granted summary judgment for INA.35 The
court concluded that the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute36 did not extend
jurisdiction over Erma,37 and that even if it had extended to Erma,
assertion of jurisdiction by the Kentucky courts would violate due pro-
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 1981-P, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Ky. May 1, 1975).
28 The district court observed that:
Without the separate corporate entity fiction, Erma is nothing more than afactory owned by
LSI. Even with the fiction, since LSI is the sole shareholder in Erma, whatever happens to
Erma necessarily affects LSI to an equal extent. A closer union of interests would be dicult to
imagine.
Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 198 I-P, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Ky. May 1, 1975) (emphasis added).
29 The district court stressed the state's interest in providing a forum in which the plaintiff
could adjudicate his claims. The court observed that had it not held LSI liable, the plaintiff, in
order to recover, would have to bring the action in a German court. Id. at 5.
30 Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1969 (1977).
31 Id. at 960.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 961. The Sixth Circuit also discussed the reluctance of Kentucky courts to hold a
parent corporation liable for the actions of a subsidiary absent a showing that but for the parent
corporation's control over the subsidiary, the plaintiff could have obtained a remedy against the
subsidiary at law.
34 Brief for Appellee at 3, Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
35 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 15 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
36 Ky. REV. STAT. § 454.210(2)(a)(4)-(5) (1970). The text of these subsections is quoted supra
in note 22.
37 The district court interpreted sections four and five of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute to
be more stringent than the minimum contacts standard. The court held that the Kentucky Long-
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cess as defined by the Sixth Circuit3" and as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.39
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and upheld personal juris-
diction over Erma.4° The Sixth Circuit based its conclusion on three
factors. First, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Kentucky legislature
intended the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute to reach the outer limits of
due process.41 The reviewing court based its interpretation of the stat-
ute on its language, its preamble, and the case law interpreting the stat-
ute.42 Secondly, by imputing L.A.'s business activities in Kentucky to
Erma, the court found that Erma's contact with Kentucky satisfied the
due process requirements outlined in International Shoe4 3 and its prog-
eny.' Finally, the Sixth Circuit briefly noted the constitutional differ-
Arm Statute required a foreign corporation to have sustained substantial contacts in Kentucky.
Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 9 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
38 Apparently, the district court assumed that the Sixth Circuit would apply the minimum
contacts standard as enunciated in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and inquire, specifi-
cally, whether the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting busi-
ness in Kentucky. Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip. op. at 12-14 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 6, 1977).
39 The district court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), retreated from the expansive interpretation of "minimum contacts" set forth in
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No.
1981-P(G), slip op. at 14 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
40 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
The court concluded that Kentucky law would determine the power of a Kentucky court to assert
personal jurisdiction over Erma on the basis of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
and Smart v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963). Poyner, 618 F.2d at 1187.
41 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1189. The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
subsections four and five of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute was more liberal than the district
court's finding that those sections required more substantial contact than required under due
process.
42 Id. at 1188-89.
43 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Poyner court observed that
three criteria have been established in the Sixth Circuit to determine due process under Interna-
tional Shoe's minimum contacts requirement:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must
arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences
caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to
make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1190. This three-pronged test was first enunciated in
Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968). After the Supreme
Court's decisions in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), and World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), it is clear that the minimum contacts formula re-
quires that the defendant purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting or causing a conse-
quence in the forum state. Although the second prong of the test will often serve as a basis for
determining if the defendant sustained contact with the forum, the third prong does not advance
due process analysis since it only focuses upon whether the defendant's contact with the forum
was substantial, and does not discuss if those activities were voluntary.
44 These opinions demonstrate the Court's varying conclusions concerning the degree of con-
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ence between asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant and over
an alien defendant. The Sixth Circuit observed that the minimum con-
tacts formula served to limit the jurisdictional reach of the sovereign
states. As that objective was minimized in an international context, the
court submitted that it would be constitutional to apply a less stringent
minimum contacts formula to alien defendants .4  The Sixth Circuit
then reversed and remanded, directing the district court to consider
other grounds for summary judgment or to dispose of the case on the
merits.46
DISCUSSION
I. "THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION THEORY
A. The State's Power to Serve Alien and Foreign
Defendants with Process
Until the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in In-
ternational Shoe,4 7 a state court traditionally asserted jurisdiction over
an entity under three sets of circumstances: (1) the physical presence of
the defendant or his property in the state;48 (2) the defendant's consent
to suit in that state;49 or (3) the presence of the defendant's domicile or
tact with the forum necessary to satisfy due process: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Court refused to grant jurisdiction over an auto manufacturer who had sold a
defective car to the plaintiffs, observing that the defendants could not have reasonably anticipated
that the plaintiffs would have been involved in an accident in a distant forum); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977) (ownership of stock by the directors of a corporation was insufficient contact);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's assertion of
jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee, concluding that even though the settlor had resided
in Florida and received income from a trust in that State, there was not enough contact to satisfy
due process); and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (Court found that
entry into an insurance contract, the defendant's sole contact with the forum, was sufficient activ-
ity for jurisdictional purposes).
45 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1192.
46 Id.
47 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
48 Formerly, state courts were not empowered to serve foreign defendants who were not "pres-
ent" in the forum state. The prevailing notion was that a state only had power over property in its
jurisdiction. See Lynch, Recent Developments in Securing Jurisdiction Over Foreign Firms and In-
dividuals, 11 LAW. AM. 375 (1979). For a discussion of the territorial notion of jurisdiction, see
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, From
Pennoyer to Denckla, 4 Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958); Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate, A SuggestedAnalysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
49 This theory is based on the presumption that a foreign corporation's decision to conduct
business in a state constituted its consent to be served with process in that state: Since a corpora-
tion could not carry on business within a state without the permission of that state, the state could
impose as a condition of engaging in business within its borders a requirement that the corpora-
tion appoint an agent to receive service of process within the state. Kurland, supra note 48, at 578.
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residence in that state.50 The notion that a state's jurisdictional powers
were limited to its territorial boundaries was enunciated in Pennoyer v.
Neff,51 where the Supreme Court refused to recognize substituted serv-
ice as a method of acquiring personal jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant.52 The Pennoyer Court did not, however, preclude establishing
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The Court observed that a
judgment rendered by a state court would be given full faith and
credit 53 by its sister states if it conformed to due process requirements.
54
Specifically, a state court could serve a nonresident defendant with
process if the defendant was present in the forum state or had con-
sented to appoint a representative in the forum to receive notice of a
pending action. Although Pennoyer established the foundation for de-
termining jurisdictional bases over nonresident defendants, the Court's
refusal to recognize "substituted service" 55 posed procedural difficulties
when a plaintiff filed suit against a nonresident defendant or foreign
corporation in the plaintiffs forum. Even though the nonresident de-
fendant conducted business in or committed a tort within the plaintiff's
forum state, courts were often unable to assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant if he did not own property within the state.56 The
Kurland pointed out certain problems with this theory. First, Kurland questioned whether a cor-
poration can "implicitly consent to do business in a state." Id. Second, this state action might
violate the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses. According to Kurland, no satisfac-
tory theory of personal jurisdiction could be developed until the courts recognized that "the real
question becomes not whether a state could itself enforce a judgment, but under what circum-
stances the national power should be used to assist the extra-territorial enforcement of a state's
judicial decrees." Id. at 585.
50 See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 48, at 1150.
51 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1878). In Pennoyer, the Court faced the issue of whether to recognize
an Oregon judgment that upheld the validity of the transfer of the title to the defendant's property,
even though the defendant was a resident of California and had not been personally notified of
any action pending against him. Pursuant to an Oregon statute, the defendant had been given
notice only by the publication in a state newspaper of a pending action to transfer his Oregon
property. The Supreme Court refused to grant Oregon personal jurisdiction over the defendant
on the basis of substituted service.
52 The Supreme Court, however, indicated that substituted service would be constitutionally
permissible to obtain in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 733.
53 A major purpose of the minimum contacts formula is to limit the jurisdictional reach of
coequal sovereigns. In Volkswagen, the Court emphasized that judgments which violate due pro-
cess are void in the forum state, and will not be entitled to full faith and credit in any state.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
54 See Kurland, supra note 48, at 571-73. Kurland observed that the due process requirements
outlined in Pennoyer have been the "backbone" of personal jurisdiction theory. Id. at 570.
55 Substituted service was the forerunner of the long-arm statute. It was a means of serving a
nonresident defendant with process. Before International Shoe, many courts refused to permit a
plaintiff to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant in this manner. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945).
56 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court concluded that a court could constitutionally serve a for-
Poyner v. Erma Werke
4:323(1982)
Court resolved the dilemma of actions against foreign corporations by
predicating jurisdiction on whether the corporation conducted business
within the forum state. 7 The Court presumed that the corporation's
business activities rendered it "present" in the forum state for jurisdic-
tional purposes.
5 8
The "doing business" test, however, further complicated jurisdic-
tional analysis, as it lacked clear standards for determining the extent
of business necessary to satisfy due -process requirements. Conse-
quently, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,59 the Supreme Court
shifted the due process emphasis to a reasonableness inquiry by adopt-
ing a flexible formula which weighed the interests of all the parties to
determine the scope of the state's jurisdiction. International Shoe in-
volved an action by the State of Washington against the International
Shoe Company of Delaware.6 0 The State sought to recover unemploy-
ment compensation taxes from International Shoe on the basis of com-
pensation paid to thirteen salesmen that the company employed on a
full-time commission basis to display its products within the State of
Washington. International Shoe had no offices in Washington, and
made no contracts for the sale or purchase of merchandise in Washing-
ton. The salesmen occasionally rented rooms in which they displayed
various shoe samples to prospective purchasers. All orders were trans-
mitted to and filled in International Shoe's principal place of business,
St. Louis. Goods were shipped F.O.B.6" from places outside Washing-
ton to purchasers within the state. The Court ruled that it was reason-
able to assert jurisdiction over the International Shoe Company,
eign defendant if he owned property in the state or if he voluntarily appeared in court. Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 914 (1878). State courts could not serve a foreign corporation since the
corporation's legal existence was limited to the incorporating state's territory. See Bank of Au-
gusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). See also Hazard, supra note 48, at 272. Hazard noted
that Pennoyer determined jurisdiction in the United States for almost 25 years. According to
Hazard, Pennoyer exerted three distinct impacts: (1) "Pennoyer limited the reach of state court
service, and thus posed problems for certain plaintiffs, e.g., those injured by motorists from an-
other state." See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); (2) Pennoyer established that seizing a
defendant's property was insufficient to notify the defendant of a pending law suit; (3) "Pennoyer
also differentiated between in rem and in personam jurisdiction." Id. Hazard stressed that the
differentiation between the two types of jurisdictions is unpredictable and, thus, useless. Id.
57 See the discussion of the evolution of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in
Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
58 See supra note 48.
59 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
60 The International Shoe Company conducted business in several states in the United States.
61 F.O.B. is the abbreviation of "free on board." The term is used to designate the person who
bears the risk of loss and shipment costs of the goods. Ifa contract is F.O.B. destination, the seller
bears the costs of shipment. Conversely, if it is F.O.B. origin, the buyer bears the costs once the
goods are duly delivered to a carrier.
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emphasizing that the company had maintained sufficient minimum
contacts with the State of Washington:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure
. .. [a defendant may be subject to a judgment in personam where]
operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to
make it reasonable andjust, according to our traditional conception offair
play and substantialjustice.
62
Although International Shoe established a broad and flexible mini-
mum contacts standard to determine whether a defendant's activities
were sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction over a defendant, 63 the
Court also outlined several factors which courts should balance. The
Court found that the state's interest 64 in providing a forum in which the
state's inhabitants could achieve justice, the extent of the defendant's
business activities in the state, the burden upon the defendant if he
were subjected to litigation in the forum, 65 and the relationship be-
tween the cause of action and the defendant's activities in the forum
66
should be considered in determining the constitutionality of asserting
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
International Shoe also marked the expansion of the long-arm stat-
ute.67 Once the Supreme Court established the constitutionality of con-
structive service, state legislators approved long-arm statutes which
62 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310, 319-20 (emphasis added). Interpreting the outer limits
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court maintained that due process
requires providing the defendant with adequate notice of the suit, and that he be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. In Volkswagen, the Court noted that the policy protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and ensures that the states,
through their courts, do not reach beyond the limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns
in the federal system. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
63 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. Commentators have interpreted International Shoe to
establish a flexible policy for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. See Kurland, supra note 48, at
591; Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Pre-
diction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 869 (1978).
64 The Court discussed the state's interest in receiving taxes from those who invoke the bene-
fits and protections of the state. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321. Historically, states have
broad discretion in the area of taxation.
65 Id. at 318. The Court suggested that a corporation's single act committed within a forum
state might be an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.
66 Id. at 319. See infra note 69.
67 See Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 989, 999 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. The authors note that during the same year International
Shoe was decided, Vermont and Maryland enacted laws which subjected foreign corporations to
suits arising from torts committed in the forum state or contacts made there. See also Hazard,
supra note 48, at 292. Hazard stressed that long-arm statutes would fill a gap in the United States
jurisdictional system, as they would enable plaintiffs to sue out-of-state persons in instances such
as disastrous accidents and products liability cases.
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enabled courts to serve out-of-state-or-nation persons who had com-
mitted a local tort, entered a local contract, or owned local property.
68
B. Minimum Contacts After International Shoe: An Expansive
Interpretation
Following International Shoe, the Supreme Court broadened the
scope of the minimum contacts formula. In Perkins v. Benguet Mining
Co. ,69 the Supreme Court concluded that a state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over an alien corporation, if a corporate official is doing
business in that state and is personally served with process, regardless
of the fact that the cause of action is unrelated to the business con-
ducted in the forum state. In McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co. ,7 moreover, the Supreme Court extended the notion of personal
jurisdiction to its furthest limits by permitting jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation on the basis of a single act-entry into an insurance
contract.7 ' To support its conclusion in McGee, the Court maintained
68 For further discussion, see supra note 7. The notion that a state has a strong interest in
providing a forum in which its residents may bring their claims against nonresidents is not unique
to the United States. Many civil law countries have enacted such provisions. The French Code,
for example, provides that French courts have jurisdiction over a person who injures a French
citizen. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 14. Further, Section 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "actions against a person without domicile in the interior may be brought before a
court in whose district the property of the defendant is situated." ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO]
§ 23, as reprinted in Note, Civil Procedure-Long-Arm Statutes-Jurisdiction Over,41ien Manufac-
turers in Products Liability Actions, 18 vAYNE L. REV. 1585, 1591 (1972).
69 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins, the plaintiff shareholder of the defendant corporation
brought suit in Ohio against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., a corporation organized under
the laws of the Phillippines. The Court upheld Ohio's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant mining company, even though the cause of action was unrelated to the business con-
ducted in the state.
Some commentators maintain that Perkins should be limited to its facts. See, e.g., Von Meh-
ren & Trautman, supra note 48, at 1144. These commentators suggest that Perkins is an excep-
tional extension of personal jurisdiction. They maintain that the defendant's contacts with Ohio
were extremely tenuous. Despite this, the Court permitted the plaintiff to file suit in Ohio,
stressing that as a result of the Second World War, the defendant had no other alternative but to
bring suit in that forum. The courts, however, have not interpreted Perkins in this manner.
Rather, courts view Perkins as providing state courts with an option to assert jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1980); Long v. Vessel "Miss Ida
Ann," 490 F. Supp. 210 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit glossed over whether the
cause of action arose from Erma's activities in Kentucky. The court concluded that it was more
probable than not that the cause of action arose from Erma's activities in Kentucky, given Erma's
relationship with L.A. and L.A.'s relationship with Bear. Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d
at 1191.
70 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
71 In McGee, id., the Court upheld jurisdiction even though the defendant insurance com-
pany's only contacts with the state were through the defendant's letters to the plaintiffs son, a
resident of the forum state, California. The plaintiffrsson had taken out an insurance policy from
a company located in Texas. After the insured died, the insurance company refused to pay the
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that the insurance contract between the plaintiff's decedent and the in-
surance company demonstrated a substantial connection with the State
of California.
7 2
The Court's liberal construction of the minimum contacts formula
in McGee and Perkins affirmed that a state has a strong interest in pro-
viding a convenient forum in which the plaintiff can redress grievances.
The plaintiff, permitted to litigate in his forum state, would avoid the
expense and inconvenience of bringing an action in a distant state or
nation.73 Further, had the plaintiff been forced to litigate in the alien
defendant's forum, he might have been disadvantaged by language
barriers and an unfamiliar legal system.
Some courts adopted interpretations of the minimum contacts
formula which were more expansive than those set forth by the
Supreme Court in McGee and Perkins. Reading McGee to sanction
jurisdiction over an alien or foreign defendant on the basis of any iso-
lated act, several courts advanced the "stream of commerce" theory:74
[A] manufacturer who voluntarily plac[ed] his product in the national
channels of commerce not only [submitted] himself to jurisdiction in all
states where his product cause[d] injury, but also to the law of those
states.75
Some jurisdictions, however, stretched the minimum contacts formula
proceeds of the insured's claim. The plaintiff then brought suit against the defendant insurance
company in the state of California and obtained a default judgment. Since she was unable to
execute the default judgment, the plaintiff filed suit in Texas. Maintaining that the California
judgment violated due process, the Texas court dismissed the plaintiff's request for relief. The
Supreme Court reversed the Texas court and upheld jurisdiction on the basis of the insurance
contract. Id.
72 The Court observed that the insurance contract demonstrated a substantial connection with
the State of California, and that California had a strong interest in providing redress for its citi-
zens wronged by persons outside of the state.
73 For example, in Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Court, 400 Colo. 400, 532 P.2d 351
(1965), the court permitted jurisdiction over the defendants, observing that it would be easier for
the defendant, a worldwide corporation, to litigate in a foreign country than the plaintiff. More-
over, the court noted that the plaintiff's witnesses were in the United States. See also Duple Motor
Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1969) (the court observed: "[Tihe hard-
ship of defending the [defective] product in [a foreign state] . . must be assumed as an attribute
of foreign trade. ... ); Olmstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 487 P.2d 234 (1971)
(court noted that it was more reasonable to place the burden of litigating in a foreign forum on the
defendant as it was a worldwide manufacturer whereas the plaintiffs were local businessmen);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 196 N.E.2d 761 (1961)
(court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that manufactured a safety valve in Ohio-the
safety valve had been incorporated into a hot water heater in Pennsylvania and the defective
product was subsequently sold to an Illinois purchaser).
74 Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 647-50 (N.D. InI. 1965); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 441-43 196 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
75 Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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even further when the defendant was an alien. Courts in those states
asserted jurisdiction over an alien defendant on the basis of his aggre-
gate contacts with the nation, even though the alien corporation had
established either no contact or insufficient contact with the forum
state.76
C Personal Jurisdiction Narrowed. Emphasizing the Defendant's
Interest in Adjudication
Shortly after McGee and Perkins, the Supreme Court narrowed
personal jurisdiction theory by shifting the focus of the minimum con-
tacts analysis from the plaintiff's burden to the defendant's burden.77
Recognizing the inconvenience to a defendant required to litigate in a
forum when his contact with that forum was insignificant or fortuitous,
the Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denckla,7 limited a state's jurisdic-
tional reach to a defendant who deliberately sustained contact within
the state.79 The Court in Hanson held that the Florida Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee, even
though the settlor of the trust had resided in Florida at the time of her
death and had received income from the trust while she resided in Flor-
ida. The Court distinguished McGee from Hanson by comparing the
nature of the defendants' contact with their respective forums. In Mc-
76 For example, in Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975),
jurisdiction was sustained over an alien corporation even though the defendant's contacts with the
forum state were questioned:
[W]hen a federal court is asked to exercise personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant sued
on a claim arising out of federal law, jurisdiction may appropriately be determined on the
basis of the alien's aggregated contacts with the United States as a whole, regardless of
whether the contacts with the state in which the district court sits would be sufficient consid-
ered alone. Id. at 290.
Accord Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (nationwide con-
tacts served as a basis for jurisdiction in an admiralty action); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v.
Mannesmann, S.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (conceding that Congress had not enacted a
federal statute authorizing jurisdiction on the basis of an alien's contact with the United States, the
court nonetheless upheld jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of its nationwide contact).
77 Some courts, however, equally weighed the factors delineated in International Shoe. See,
e.g., Woods, supra note 63, at 890-98. Some commentators have suggested that each case should
be decided on its own merits, regardless of the inconsistency inherent in this process. See Lynch,
supra note 48, at 394; Note, Lakeside Bridge and Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.:
Inflexible Application of Long-Arm Jurisdiction Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 345, 356 (1980). Given the Court's conclusion after Volkswagen, that the minimum
contacts formula requires that the defendant deliberately sustain contact with the forum, it is
unlikely that courts will balance equally the "parties' interests" when determining the constitu-
tionality of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
78 357 U.S. 235 (1957). Although Hanson was decided during a period of expansion of state
courts' personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, the Supreme Court cautioned that terri-
torial limitations still restricted the states' jurisdictional power. Id. at 251.
79 Id.
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Gee, the Court observed, the insurance company had voluntarily solic-
ited business in California, while in Hanson, the trustee's contact with
Florida resulted from the settlor's decision to move to that state. Rein-
terpreting the minimum contacts formula, the Court concluded that "in
each case there [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."80
For the next twenty years, the Supreme Court was silent as to
whether the Hanson decision was an aberration or whether it signalled
a movement toward imposing restrictions upon the then expansive in-
terpretation of personal jurisdiction."' The jurisdictional question
arose again in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 2 where the Supreme
Court limited a state's jurisdictional authority. The Court held that a
father's act of sending a child to live with her mother in another state
did not indicate the father's intent to obtain a benefit from that state,
and thus the act was not a basis on which a state court could assert
personal jurisdiction over the father.8 3
Two years after Kulko, the Court, in World- Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson,84 reaffirmed that the scope of the minimum contacts stan-
dard had been narrowed. Volkswagen involved motorists travelling
from New York to Arizona who were injured in Oklahoma when their
car was struck and subsequently caught fire. The motorists filed a
products liability action in Oklahoma against the car manufacturer, its
80 Id. at 253.
81 In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), Justice Brennan, dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part, infused vitality into the Hanson interpretation of the minimum contacts formula.
According to Brennan, minimum contacts should be determined on the basis of whether the
defendants voluntarily associated themselves with the forum state. Id. at 227-28. Brennan, how-
ever, did not assert that that standard requires subordination of all other factors in Volkswagen.
Brennan disagreed with the narrow interpretation placed upon the stream of commerce theory by
the majority:
It is difficult to see why the constitution should distinguish between a case involving goods
which reach a distant state through a chain of distribution and a case involving goods which
reach the same state because a consumer, using them as the dealer knew the customer would,
took them there. In each case the seller purposefulo injects the goods into the stream of
commerce and those goods predictably are used in the forum state.
Id. at 507-08. Brennan also vigorously dissented because the Volkswagen court, in his estimation,
accorded insufficient weight to the forum state's interest in the case.
82 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
83 Id. at 95.
84 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See Louis, The Grasp of Long-Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its
Reach: A Comment on World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuck, 58 N.C.
L. REv. 407 (1980). Louis contends that although Volkswagen and Kulko were decided during a
period in which the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over a defendant was determined by
the effect of the defendant's acts or the forseeability of the impact of these acts in the forum state,
those cases rejected this theory. Id. at 425.
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importer, its regional distributor, and its local dealer. Service of pro-
cess was obtained against all the defendants under the Oklahoma
Long-Arm Statute. The Supreme Court noted that although the plain-
tifrs interest and the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dis-
pute should be considered, the primary focus of due process analysis
was on the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum state to determine if it would be reasonable and non-burdensome
for the defendant to conduct its defense there."- The Court stressed
that only when a corporation has purposefully availed itself of the priv-
ilege of conducting activities within the forum state is it on notice that
it is subject to suit within the forum state, and thus able to take appro-
priate measures to alleviate the risks of litigation.86 The Volkswagen
court observed that an isolated occurrence, absent an expectation that
the product would be marketed in the state, would not be a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction.87
II. ANALYSIS OF POYNER
A. The Kentucky Long-Arm Statute
The Sixth Circuit's decision to assert jurisdiction over Erma is
based upon incorrect interpretations of the Kentucky Long-Arm Stat-
ute and the minimum contacts formula. The plaintiff relied on subsec-
tions four88 and five89 of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute, the
negligence and breach of warranty provisions of the act, respectively.
Although these subsections broaden the jurisdictional reach of Ken-
tucky courts, neither provision is coextensive with due process because
each requires the defendant to sustain substantial contact with the fo-
rum. Subsection four permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
85 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
86 Id. at 297.
87 Volkswagen appears to narrow, but does not eliminate, the stream of commerce theory as a
basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The forum state does not exceed its powers under
the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the goods will be marketed in that
state. Id. at 298.
88 See Phillips, The Kentucky Long-Arm Statute: How Long Is It? 4 N.E. KY. L. REv. 65, 75
(1977) ("The 'tortious' act provision of the statute is important because it fills the jurisdictional
void which exists when plaintiffs seek to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents who come here and
cause injury by a single isolated act."). Under subsection four of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute,
the injury must occur in Kentucky. Id. at 76. See supra note 22.
89 Under the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute, a plaintiff may recover economic or commercial
damages. KY. REv. STAT. § 454.210(2)(a)(5) (1970). The text of subsection five is quoted supra in
note 22. The plaintiff must prove, however, that the injury arose from a breach of warranty of
goods known to affect Kentucky commerce, and that the manufacturer derived monetary benefits
from marketing his product in Kentucky. Phillips, supra note 88, at 79.
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over a nonresident if the nonresident derives, among other things, sub-
stantial revenue from goods used or consumed in Kentucky, and the
tortious injury arose as a result of the nonresident's regular and persis-
tent business activities in the forum.90 Subsection five, which autho-
rizes jurisdiction over a non-resident who distributes goods directly or
indirectly in Kentucky and breaches an express or implied warranty
made in connection with the sale of those goods, also requires regular
and persistent business contact with Kentucky.9
Moreover, unlike other provisions of this statute, these subsections
require greater contact with the forum state. Although subsection
one92 authorizes jurisdiction if a claim arises from the transaction of
any business in the Commonwealth, the negligence and breach of war-
ranty subsections require regular, persistent, and substantial contact
with Kentucky.93 Subsection one, significantly broader than the negli-
gence and breach of warranty provisions, has been interpreted as coex-
tensive with due process.94 Further, Kentucky courts have concluded
that the negligence and breach of warranty provisions require greater
contact than other provisions of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute.
None of the three precedents 95 relied upon by the Sixth Circuit inter-
90 Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.210 (1970). See supra note 37.
91 Id
92 Id Subsection one of section two of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute provides jurisdiction
under the following circumstances:
454.210. Personal jurisdiction of courts over nonresidents-Process. How served-Venue.-
(1) As used in this section, "person" includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or
other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or
commercial entity, who is a nonresident of this commonwealth.
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
I. Transacting any business in this commonwealth.
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 454.210(l)-(2)(a)(I) (1970).
93 See supra notes 88 and 89. The district court in Poyner stressed the difference between the
subsections: "Given the broad language of KRS 454.210(2)(a) 1, the more restrictive language
contained in Sections 4 & 5 of the same statute obviously shows a desire to limit what 'contacts'
will be in cases arising in tort or warranty." Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 198 1-P(G), slip
op. (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977). The district court also noted that the use of the words "regularly,"
"persistent," and "substantial" in subsections four and five support the proposition that the Ken-
tucky legislature intended substantial contacts, and not minimal contacts, to be the basis for as-
serting personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations under Subsections 4 and 5 of the Kentucky
Long-Arm Statute. Id. Finally, the Kentucky Business Corporation Act, KY. REv. STAT. § 271
A.520 (Supp. 1978) specifies 10 activities that are not considered transacting business, and corpo-
rations which engage in those activities do not have to apply to the state for certification to con-
duct business in Kentucky. Arguably, four of the 10 exemptions apply to Erma's activities in
Kentucky: e) affecting sales through independent contractors; f) soliciting orders which require
acceptance outside Kentucky before becoming binding contracts; i) transacting any business in
interstate commerce; and j) conducting an isolated transaction of less than 30 days duration. Id
94 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 7-8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
95 See Etheridge v. Grove Mfg. Co., 415 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1969) (jurisdiction sustained over
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preted the negligence subsection to be coextensive with due process,
and only one precedent,96 decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
found the breach of warranty subsection to extend to that limit.
By applying a broader minimum contacts standard, the Sixth Cir-
cuit precluded consideration of whether Erma's contact with Kentucky
fell within the meaning of the negligence and breach of warranty sub-
sections of the statute. Further, the Sixth Circuit gave cursory treat-
ment to the issue of whether Erma sustained any contact with
Kentucky. As Erma had no direct contact with Kentucky, the court
imputed L.A.'s activities in that state to Erma. It is not firmly estab-
lished that a distributor's contact may be imputed to the manufacturer
as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction.97 Even if the court could
impute L.A.'s contact with the state to Erma, the court should nonethe-
less have determined whether L.A.'s contact with Kentucky was regu-
lar, persistent, and substantial.
the defendant corporation on the basis of the defendant's salesman's activities in the forum);
Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977) (jurisdiction upheld over a foreign auto-
mobile manufacturer who advertised in Kentucky, and pursuant to agreements with Kentucky
automobile dealers, provided services to Kentucky citizens); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nantz, 516
S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1974) (court dismissed the defendant's argument that the Kentucky Long-Arm
Statute controlled venue actions). The observation of the courts in Etheridge v. Grove Mfg. and
FordMotor Credit Co. v. Nantz that the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute reached nonresident corpo-
rations with minimal contacts in Kentucky is tenuous since these observations are mainly dicta.
In Etheridge, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply subsection four of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute
retroactively to a tort action because the plaintiff had filed the complaint prior to the enactment of
the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute. In Nantz, there was no issue pertaining to whether the defend-
ant company had conducted business within the meaning of subsection four of the Kentucky
Long-Arm Statute. Further, reliance on Nantz is even more tenuous since the Nantz court's inter-
pretation of the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute is based upon dictum in Etheridge.
96 Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977). In Volvo, the plaintiff, a Ken-
tucky resident, bought a car from a Volvo dealer in West Virginia. The car was delivered to the
plaintiff in Kentucky. After the car malfunctioned, plaintiff filed suit against the dealer. The
dealer filed an indemnity claim against Volvo. The court held that Volvo, the manufacturer of the
automobile, knew or should have known that vehicles shipped to West Virginia would be sold in
Kentucky, and thus was subject to jurisdiction under the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute. Unlike
Erma, however, Volvo advertised in Kentucky and provided service to its customers through deal-
ers in Kentucky.
97 Compare Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977), with Tube Turns v.
Division of Clemetren, 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1979). The Tube Turns court held that absent proof
that the defendant should have anticipated that its contact with the Tube Turn Company could
have had a substantial impact on commerce in Kentucky, the Kentucky court's assertion of juris-
diction would be unreasonable and a violation of due process. See also Velandra v. Regie Nation-
ale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964) (in a suit against an alien parent
corporation, the parent's contact with the jurisdiction, and not the foreign subsidiary's contact,
was determined to be the primary factor to consider for jurisdictional purposes).
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B. The Constitutional Anaysis
Besides misconstruing the Kentucky Long-Arm Statute, the Sixth
Circuit failed to recognize that the Supreme Court modified due pro-
cess requirements by narrowing the scope of the minimum contacts
formula. The court misinterpreted Volkswagen, and thus did not deter-
mine if Erma's contact with Kentucky was purposeful. Further, the
Sixth Circuit ignored significant constitutional and practical considera-
tions by concluding that it would be permissible to apply more relaxed
jurisdictional standards to alien defendants.98 Because Erma sustained
no direct contact with Kentucky,99 the Sixth Circuit reviewed the con-
tacts Erma's distributor sustained with Kentucky to determine if Erma
had deliberately invoked the benefits and privileges of doing business
in the state. The record disclosed that L.A. and Erma had entered into
an agreement whereby L.A. was the exclusive United States distributor
of Erma's products. The district court noted that L.A. admitted im-
porting Erma's pistols and distributing them in certain areas in the
United States, and that some pistols ultimately were distributed in
Kentucky. The district court also found that L.A. sold exclusively to
wholesalers, maintained an office in New York City and a warehouse
in North Carolina, and solicited business in Kentucky through mail
order catalogues, telephone calls, and at a national sporting goods con-
vention in Chicago.' L.A. also admitted employing Stuart Bear, the
Tennessee salesman, who eventually sold the defective firearm. L.A.
further admitted that there was at least one distributor of its products in
Lexington, Kentucky.
The Sixth Circuit's inquiry, however, ended at this point. The
court failed to consider any economic factors to determine if Erma had
obtained substantial revenue and thus benefitted from its alleged busi-
ness in Kentucky. The minimum contacts formula, focusing on the
quality and nature of the defendant's activities in the state, requires an
assessment of the defendant's business activities in the forum.' 0 ' In
Volkswagen and International Shoe,102 the Supreme Court observed
98 See Note, Civil Procedure-Long 4rm Statute-Jurisdiction over Alien Manufacturers in
Products Liability.4ctions, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1585, 1588-89 (1972).
99 Although Erma is a wholly owned subsidiary of an American corporation, LSI, that fact is
not important for the purposes of this litigation since LSI did not own Erma when the tort oc-
curred. Erma also has no offices or assets in Kentucky and does no advertising in the United
States. All of its guns are sold to distributors in Germany.
100 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
101 The district court pointed this out: "Unfortunately, plaintiff has not, in all the years of this
lawsuit, tracked down the actual dollar value of Erma's products sold in Kentucky." Id.
102 This note is limited to a discussion of the Volkswagen standard and does not purport to
discuss in depth the vitality of Gray v. American Radiator Co., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
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that only when the defendant derived commercial benefits in the fo-
rum, and thus had been protected by the laws of that state, was he
obliged to the state and therefore on notice that he was amenable to
jurisdiction in that forum.0 3 Further, the Sixth Circuit had previously
considered certain economic factors to ascertain whether the defendant
had sustained minimum contacts with a forum." 0 To evaluate Erma's
contact with Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit should have assessed the vol-
ume and value of Erma's sales in Kentucky, the ratio of those sales to
the total market for similar products in the state, and the quantity or
value of Erma's total production in respect to the total output of that
production in Kentucky. 05
Finally, the Sixth Circuit neglected to consider whether Erma had
any control over L.A.'s choice of location to distribute its products.
The Sixth Circuit improperly held that Erma's awareness of L.A.'s
marketing efforts in Kentucky constituted a purposeful availment of
the privilege of acting in Kentucky or causing injuries there. The Sixth
Circuit, however, never found that Erma's entry into Kentucky was
voluntary. Instead, it misrepresented the district court's findings by
stating that the district court had held that Erma was "a strong back-
stage promoter of its products in the United States."' 1 6 The district
court simply had concluded that since L.A. performed all the advertis-
ing and distribution of Erma's products, Erma was "at best, a strong
backstage promoter of its products," and absent evidence to determine
that L.A. was anything but an independent distributor, the district
(1961). Although the Illinois Supreme Court adopted relaxed jurisdictional standards in Gray, the
court applied the rubric of the "purposefully availing test" set out in Hanson and reaffirmed in
Volkswagen. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that the defendant's activities resulted in sub-
stantial use and consumption in this state and said: "To the extent that its business may be di-
rectly affected by transactions occurring here, it enjoys the benefits from the laws of this state."
Id at 766.
103 This Volkswagen test has been the subject of criticism. See Comment, World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson: 4 Limit to the Expansion ofLong-,4rm Jurisdiction, 69 CAL. L. REv. 611
(1981). This commentator argued that Volkswagen's circularity renders it virtually useless. Al-
though difficult to apply, the Volkswagen test requires a determination that the manufacturer ex-
pects his goods to enter a forum. This is different from fortuitously finding that these goods are in
the forum. Indeed, this commentator conceded that Volkswagen has been viewed as a restriction
upon personal jurisdiction theory.
104 See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964). Instead
of distinguishing Velandra because it was an older decision, and an inherently dangerous product
was at issue, the Sixth Circuit should have addressed some of the economic factors outlined in
Velandra to determine if Erma had voluntarily sustained contacts with Kentucky.
105 Id at 298. It is assumed that if the plaintiff loses money he is still amenable to jurisdiction
in the state.
106 618 F.2d at 1191.
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court determined that Erma had no control over L.A. 0 7
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion ignores the salient factor in Volks-
wagen-awareness that a product might be sold in a state is insufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction. 0 8 Under the Volkswagen test, Erma
must have intended to sell its products in Kentucky and, consequently,
must have anticipated being subject to jurisdiction there.'0 9 Had the
Sixth Circuit found that Erma had control over L.A.'s distribution sys-
tem, the court's decision to invoke jurisdiction over Erma would have
been consistent with the Volkswagen minimum contacts standard. The
Supreme Court noted in Volkswagen that efforts to market a product in
a state were a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction because such ef-
forts demonstrated the defendant's intent to conduct business in the
forum. 'to
Poyner applied the Volkswagen test in form, but not in substance.
The Sixth Circuit's failure to consider adequately the burden on the
defendant forced to litigate in a forum in which he had insignificant
contact is inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements established
by the Supreme Court. Consequently, future courts should reject
Poyner's interpretation of the minimum contacts formula because it in-
vades the interests protected by Volkswagen. By concluding that the
minimum contacts test only requires the defendant to be aware that his
product might enter a forum, the Sixth Circuit virtually reincorporated
a foreseeability standard into due process analysis. The Supreme
Court, however, sought to restrict reliance upon a foreseeability stan-
dard, recognizing that such a standard would burden the defendant
with spurious claims and subject him to jurisdiction under fortuitous
circumstances. As the majority in Volkswagen noted: "if forseeability
were the criterion, every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the
chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would
travel with the chattel."' 11 The Court's narrow interpretation of the
minimum contacts formula in Volkswagen, however, eliminates these
problems. Foreign or alien defendants would only be amenable to ju-
risdiction if they voluntarily sustained minimum contacts with a forum,
and thus would be on notice of potential lawsuits.
107 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, No. 1981-P(G), slip op. at 7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 1977).
108 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
109 Gray may be consistent with Volkswagen. The Illinois Supreme Court found that, "as a
general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its goods for ultimate use in another state, juris-
diction is appropriate." Gray v. American Radiator Co., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(1961).
110 444 U.S. at 297. See also Comment, supra note 103.
ill Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296.
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C. Jurisdiction over Alien Defendants
In addition to incorrectly interpreting the Volkswagen standard in
Poyner, the Sixth Circuit exceeded its jurisdictional authority by con-
cluding that more relaxed jurisdictional requirements should be ap-
plied to an alien defendant." 2 The court's conclusion resulted from
overemphasizing the state's interest in adjudicating the claims of alien
defendants and failing to apply fundamental constitutional
considerations.
1. The State's Interest in Adjudication of Claims against Alien
Defendants
A literal interpretation of Volkswagen suggests that the state's in-
terest in adjudicating a dispute is only material if the defendant volun-
tarily sustains contact with the forum 'state."t3 Most courts, however,
have not read Volkswagen so narrowly."' Similarly, in Poyner, the
112 One commentator has argued that Volkswagen sanctions applying a less relaxed jurisdic-
tional standard to alien defendants. See Comment, supra note 103. According to this commenta-
tor, courts are not bound by principles of federalism when the defendant is an alien, and thus
should apply less restrictive minimum contacts standards to those defendants. This argument
ignores general fundamental constitutional factors. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
Compare Shon v. District Court ex rel City, 605 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1980), with Lakeside Bridge &
Steel v. Mountain State Const. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (1979).
113 Comment, supra note 103, at 919.
114 Generally these courts did not focus on whether the defendant voluntarily sustained contact
with the forum states. See, e.g., Long v. Vessel "Miss Ida Ann," 490 F. Supp. 210, 214 (S.D. Tex.
1980) ("Cases [subsequent to Volkswagen] have held that very little purposeful activity is neces-
sary to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement."); Crawford v. Minutemen Gourmet Foods,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 181, 184 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (court noted that "the test of whether a nonresident
corporation is amenable [to jurisdiction] in the forum state. . . should also focus on whether the
contacts involving the nonresident were the result of actions taken by the nonresident that reason-
ably constitute purposefully conducting activities within the forum state."); Corsica Livestock
Sales, Inc. v. Sumitomo Bank of Cal., 486 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D.S.D. 1980) (court upheld jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, observing that "the more slight the contact between the defendants and
the forum state, the stronger and more direct must be the relationship between the cause of action
and the contacts with the forum."); Berkley Int'l Co., Ltd., 289 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1980) (accord-
ing to the court, the following factors should be considered before it is permissible to assert juris-
diction over the defendant: the quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of the contacts, the
source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts, the interest of the forum state,
and the convenience to the parties). See also Oswalt v. Scripto, 619 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980)
(jurisdiction is permissible over defendants who put their goods into the stream of interstate com-
merce with the knowledge or expectation that their products would eventually be brought into the
forum); Redford v. Grummar Am. Aviation Corp., 408 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (the court
adopted the stream of commerce theory to support its assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant).
But some jurisdictions have followed Volkswagen more closely. See, e.g., Bross Util. Serv. Corp.
v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Conn. 1980) (court refused to grant jurisdiction over the
defendant because events critical to the action occurred in another nation, and the defendant's
contact did not satisfy the Volkswagen test); Schwegmann Bros. v. Pharmacy Reports, Inc., 486 F.
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Sixth Circuit stressed that the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute
was a critical factor in its decision to uphold jurisdiction over Erma. I"5
The court observed that Kentucky had a strong interest in protecting its
citizens from injurious articles produced by alien manufacturers who
insulate themselves from liability by hiring a local distributor to market
their products. 1
6
Controlling the entry of defective products into a forum state is an
important state interest. 1 7 The state's interest in adjudication, how-
ever, does not become more compelling when an alien corporation,
rather than a foreign corporation, manufactures the inherently danger-
ous product. Attempts to insulate oneself from liability are not unique
to alien defendants. Thus, the critical inquiry is not where the manu-
Supp. 606 (E.D. La. 1980) (court upheld jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's continuous
and systematic contact with the forum).
115 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1192.
116 Although the current minimum contacts formula is fairer to the defendant, as he will al-
ways be on notice of a potential lawsuit, and thus may ensure against possible liability, the
formula places a heavy burden on the plaintiff injured by an inherently dangerous instrumental-
ity, e.g., the gun in Poyner. The Sixth Circuit stressed that Erma should not be permitted to shield
itself from liability by utilizing the services of a distributor. In International Shoe, the Court
suggested that when a corporate agent is distributing inherently dangerous products, due process
standards should be relaxed. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See also Hess v. Pauloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927). In the future, courts might distinguish Volkswagen since an automobile, a widely
used product, may not be considered an inherently dangerous instrumentality. That argument,
however, may be defeated since the Court in Volkswagen derided the notion that one isolated act,
regardless of the repercussions, is a sufficient basis for the invocation of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.
117 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (court noted that the
strength of the state's interest in the action may depend on the nature of the defendant's act);
Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978) (although the
court conceded that the state had a strong interest in protecting its citizens from tortious injury, it
denied jurisdiction because the defendant had not sustained minimum contacts with the forum);
Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. 11. 1962) (according to the court, a
defendant who distributes his product should be subject to jurisdiction in the forum where the
injured person resides); Van Eeuwen v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79
(1973) (court upheld jurisdiction over the German defendant who manufactured a defective print-
ing press); and Gray v. American Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961)
(court observed that "if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it
is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products.").
Some commentators have warned of the unfairness to the plaintiff of a voluntariness standard
of Hanson (and later Kulko and Volkswagen) applied to products liability cases. See Comment,
Tortious Act as a Basisfor Jurisdiction In Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 671
(1965); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in Products Liability
Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1964-65). In this latter comment, the author discusses the Single
Act Theory: "[The] fairness thesis argues that it is consonant with fairness to subject the manufac-
turer to jurisdiction, whenever his product gave rise to the cause of action within the forum state,
even though the manufacturer had no other contact with the state." Id at 1031.
Poyner v. Erma Werke
4:323(1982)
facturer is incorporated, but how a court may acquire jurisdiction over
a manufacturer who attempts to shield himself from liability.
After Volkswagen, an injured plaintiff may have recourse against
those manufacturers who hire exclusive distributors." 8 Admittedly, it
would be unreasonable to hold the distributor, merely a conduit," 9 lia-
ble for all plaintiffs injuries. If an injured plaintiff could demonstrate
that the manufacturer exerted some control over the distributor's mar-
keting practices, a court might invoke jurisdiction by imputing the dis-
tributor's activities to the manufacturer. Further, as the Poyner Court
implied, 20 a state court might afford the plaintiff redress if the mini-
mum contacts standard were interpreted more liberally when the plain-
tiff is injured by an inherently dangerous product.
Relaxing jurisdictional requirements on the basis of the manufac-
turer's control over the distributor and the injurious nature of the prod-
uct is more practical than relaxing jurisdictional requirements simply
because a defendant is an alien manufacturer. First, the minimum con-
tacts requirements delineated in Volkswagen and International Shoe
are satisfied. If the manufacturer exerts control over his distributor's
marketing practices, it is reasonable and equitable to conclude that the
manufacturer voluntarily sustained contacts with the forum. Further,
relaxing jurisdictional requirements when the plaintiff was injured by
an inherently dangerous product achieves the state's interest in control-
ling the entry of defective products. Finally, manufacturers of inher-
ently dangerous products would be more responsible to the forum,
since they could only avoid litigation by ensuring that products which
entered the state were not defective.
2. The Constitutionality of Relaxing Jurisdictional Requirements
Applied to Aliens
Besides overemphasizing the state's interest in adjudicating claims
against alien defendants, the Sixth Circuit impermissibly expanded the
state's jurisdictional authority over alien defendants. After briefly ob-
serving that the minimum contacts formula limited the jurisdictional
reach of coequal sovereigns,'12 ' the court submitted that it was less im-
portant to restrict a state's jurisdictional power when the defendant is
an alien.122 Although the Supreme Court did not discuss the role of the
118 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
119 See Van Eeuwen v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (1973).
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minimum contacts formula on the international level in Volkswagen, it
recognized the restrictions imposed upon a state seeking to assert juris-
diction over a defendant in another state. The Court observed that the
minimum contacts formula "acts to ensure that the states, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."'
' 23
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning, however, suggests that relaxing ju-
risdictional requirements in an international setting would not present
constitutional problems. The court apparently ignored the potential
conflicts in interstate and international commerce. The federal govern-
ment, and not state governments, has authority to regulate interna-
tional commerce. 124 The Constitution expressly limits state regulation
of international commerce by providing that the national government
has complete power over international affairs, and state governments
cannot curtail or interfere with the exercise of that power. 25 The pur-
pose of the commerce clause is to ensure that uniformity exists when
the states deal with other nations. 26 If some states follow Poyner, how-
ever, and apply its relaxed jurisdictional approach rather than the Volk-
swagen standard, uniformity is frustrated, and there is potential for
interference with international commerce.
127
Even if the exercise of jurisdiction by a state is not found to inter-
fere with or curtail the federal government's power over international
affairs, a state might challenge another state's broad assertion of juris-
dictional authority over an alien defendant. It is conceivable that the
relaxed jurisdictional standard recommended in Poyner might deter
certain alien manufacturers from doing business in the United
States. 28 Consequently, other states might view this jurisdictional ap-
proach as unduly burdening interstate commerce, and challenge the
state's jurisdictional practices as an interference with interstate
commerce.
123 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
124 See U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 1, 10.
125 Id Article I, section 8 grants Congress power to regulate interstate commerce and com-
merce with foreign nations.
126 Developments, supra note 67, at 983. Whether the commerce clause would be invoked to
limit jurisdiction in Poyner is debatable. Because the injury occurred in Kentucky, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision might not be challenged. On the other hand, this commentator observed that "a
defendant assessing the risk of doing business in a particular state should not be expected to
provide for the contingency of suit on totally unrelated causes of action, even if brought only by
persons who were residents at the time the cause of action accrued." Id at 986.
127 Even Gray incorporated a voluntariness standard into the minimum contacts inquiry, and
thus eliminated situations where jurisdiction would have been proper under fortuitous circum-
stances. Gray v. American Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 761 (1961).
128 Developments, supra note 67, at 985.
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Although the Court has never expressly invalidated the use of
more relaxed jurisdictional standards, Hanson, Kulko, and Volkswagen
suggest that broad jurisdictional theories, such as the aggregate con-
tacts theory 2 9 and perhaps the stream of commerce theory, 3 ° might
not withstand constitutional challenge. The aggregate contacts theory
poses greater constitutional difficulties because it is primarily applied in
cases involving alien defendants and thus might present equal protec-
tion problems.' 3' Courts in jurisdictions which have adopted this the-
ory contend that the aggregate contacts standard frustrates alien
corporations' attempts to avoid jurisdiction by not sustaining minimum
contacts with any state in the United States.' 32 A foreign defendant,
however, could elude jurisdiction in all but the state in which it is in-
corporated on the same basis. Moreover, had Congress seen merit in a
nationwide aggregate contacts standard, it would have enacted a fed-
eral statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service. 133 Instead,
Congress approved Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
authorizing federal courts to serve foreign or alien defendants pursuant
to a state long-arm statute, provided the defendant's contacts are suffi-
cient to invoke jurisdiction in a state Court. 13 4 Further, Congress has
not amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide for na-
tionwide service. This inaction suggests that Congress does not intend
129 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text, which discuss cases involving the stream of
commerce and aggregate contact theories.
130 Arguably, the stream of commerce theory discussed in Gray may withstand constitutional
challenge because Gray permitted jurisdiction when the defendant elected to do business in a
forum.
131 The court in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (1962), has
criticized those courts which apply the Equal Protection clause to alien corporations and, conse-
quently, limit jurisdiction over these entities:
[W]hat has frequently been overlooked is that. . .the United States is deemed to have per-
sonal jurisdiction over any defendant within the United States. . . . There is a line of cases
apparently denying the validity of an exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court over
a defendant present within the United States unless the defendant is also present. . .within
the district which the court is held. In other words, the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment upon state jurisdiction have been applied by these cases to federal jurisdiction. The
anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principal that the United States may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any defendant within the United States, but also in limiting federal
action by a constitutional provision applicable only to state action.
Id at 736-37.
132 See, e.g., Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Manesmann A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 665
(D.N.H. 1977) (court relied on McGee: "New Hampshire's interest in protecting its corporate
employers from the predatory actions of an alien corporation is at least equal to California's
interest in protecting its residents injured by a Texas Corporation."); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly,
Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). See also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F.
Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980) (although the court ultimately rejected the aggregate contacts standard,
it discussed the policies that the nationwide contacts formula purported to serve).
133 See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (D.N.J. 1980).
134 See supra note 7.
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to grant a state the authority to serve alien defendants on the basis of
the alien's contacts with the nation as opposed to the forum state.
35
3. The Alien Defendant's Burden
Instead of stressing the state's interest in adjudication, the Sixth
Circuit should have examined more thoroughly the burden imposed
upon the defendant required to litigate in the plaintiff's forum. Mini-
mizing the import of the defendant's burden, the Poyner court sug-
gested that an alien corporate defendant is able to spread the costs of
litigating in a distant forum more readily than an injured plaintiff be-
cause the growth in markets, transportation, and communication have
also made it much less burdensome for a party to defend himself in a
state where he engages in economic activity. 36 Even if this argument is
accepted, it does little to justify the Sixth Circuit's more relaxed appli-
cation of jurisdictional requirements to alien defendants. Whether or
not the defendant is a United States corporation has little or no bearing
on whether the corporate defendant or the plaintiff can better bear the
cost and inconvenience of adjudicating in a distant forum. Foreign de-
fendants engaging in business activity in a forum should be able to
spread economic burdens as well as other consequences of litigation as
easily as alien defendants.
4. The Plainti's Burden
Although the due process inquiry currently focuses upon the de-
fendant's burden, legitimate reasons have been articulated in support
of shifting the emphasis to the plaintiff's burden. Perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of invoking personal jurisdiction over an alien de-
fendant is that it would be inequitable for an innocent plaintiff to bear
the inconvenience and expense of litigating in a distant forum. 37 Al-
though certain litigation costs remain constant regardless of the forum,
it is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff litigating in an alien jurisdic-
tion will generally have greater expenses than the plaintiff litigating in
a foreign jurisdiction. Further, although most plaintiffs litigating in a
distant forum must hire new legal counsel, the plaintiff bringing suit in
an alien jurisdiction will encounter a different legal system and may be
135 Nationwide service is permitted under some federal statutes. See, e.g., Lantham Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq. (1976).
136 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1192.
137 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), emphasize this factor. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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confronted with- significant language barriers.
1 38
The ultimate inquiry is whether the additional burdens imposed
upon a plaintiff litigating in an alien forum are relevant after Volks-
wagen, and, if so, whether the burdens imposed upon the plaintiff war-
rant discriminatory treatment of alien defendants. Contrary to Poyner,
the better position is not to relax jurisdictional requirements applied to
alien defendants. By focusing due process analysis on whether the de-
fendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum state,
Volkswagen subordinated consideration of the burdens imposed upon
the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiffs burden is considerable, it should not
serve as a justification for discriminatory treatment of alien defendants.
The benefits to the plaintiff do not outweigh the economic and political
ramifications of discriminating against alien defendants. Applying a
relaxed jurisdictional standard to alien defendants might discourage an
international manufacturer with a marginal United States profit base,
unable to offset the expense and inconvenience of spurious litigation,
from marketing his products in the United States. Further, interna-
tional manufacturers might be reluctant to grant exclusive distribution
rights to American distributors, since they would have no control over
the jurisdictions in which they might become subject to suit.
The Sixth Circuit, however, apparently viewed a reduction in im-
ports as desirable. The court emphasized that the increase in interna-
tional trade in the United States during the 1970s disadvantaged some
American manufacturers because many imported goods began to dom-
inate American markets.' 39 The Sixth Circuit, however, ignored the
economic benefit to American manufacturers who market their goods
internationally. Discriminating against alien manufacturers might
harm United States trade abroad. To retaliate against the application
of a relaxed jurisdictional standard to alien defendants, courts in alien
jurisdictions might uphold jurisdiction over American manufacturers
more readily than over manufacturers from other nations.
Finally, political and legal relations between the United States and
other foreign nations might be impaired if states exceed their constitu-
tional authority in the area of international commerce. 40 When a state
court serves an alien defendant, that alien becomes subject to state and
federal laws. Although state laws vary, those differences are insignifi-
cant when compared to the vast differences between and among na-
tional legal systems. Before asserting jurisdiction over an alien
138 See cases cited supra note 73.
139 Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d at 1191-92.
140 See supra notes 124 and 125.
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defendant, a state court should also consider the jurisdictional stan-
dards of that alien's forum. By broadening its jurisdictional analysis to
include these standards, the state court may avoid offending political
agencies in the alien jurisdiction and minimize the possibility of polit-
ical reprisals against United States citizens.' 4' Finally, the due process
requirements enunciated in International Shoe and reaffirmed in Han-
son, Kulko, and Volkswagen suggest that courts should exercise judicial
restraint in the area of personal jurisdiction. The relaxed jurisdictional
standard proposed by Poyner is inconsistent with that policy. The
Sixth Circuit failed to recognize that when international parties are in-
volved, the fairness and justice objectives set forth in International Shoe
are of primary importance, because the adjudicating court's determina-
tion is binding. There is no neutral international court to review the
original proceedings. 142 Thus, the adjudicating court must ensure that
its proceedings are fair, since the alien defendant, if found liable in
damages, has no recourse.
CONCLUSION
Developments in personal jurisdiction theory have been directly
related to increases in trade between and among nations and states.
Although jurisdictional requirements have been relaxed to enable in-
jured plaintiffs to bring claims against nonresident defendants in the
plaintiff's forum state, the notion that a state's jurisdictional power is
limited by its territory has not been entirely abandoned. In Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny, the Supreme Court sought to restrict a
state's jurisdictional authority by requiring courts to balance all of the
parties' respective interests before concluding that serving a defendant
with process is constitutional. After Volkswagen, it is clear that the crit-
ical factor in due process analysis is whether the defendant deliberately
sustained minimum contacts with the forum.
The Sixth Circuit in Poyner, however, misinterpreted the mini-
mum contacts formula. Instead of focusing on whether the defendant
had deliberately sustained minimum contacts with Kentucky, the court
emphasized the state's interest in adjudicating the injured plaintif's
claim. The Supreme Court minimized the importance of this factor in
Volkswagen. Moreover, by advocating that jurisdictional requirements
be relaxed when the defendant is an alien, the Sixth Circuit violated the
141 See Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 48, at 1127. These commentators generally
discuss the repercussions of "conduct that is overly self-regarding with respect to the taking and
exercise of jurisdiction" in an international context. Id
142 Id at 1122.
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constitutional interests protected by Volkswagen and defeated the prin-
ciples of fairness and "orderly administration of the laws" outlined in
International Shoe. If the Sixth Circuit's decision in Poyner is fol-
lowed, state and federal courts will no longer apply a uniform standard
to determine the constitutionality of acquiring personal jurisdiction
over an alien defendant.
State and federal courts should reject Poyner and continue to ap-
ply the same jurisdictional requirements to alien and foreign defend-
ants. If the minimum contacts formula were applied uniformly, alien
defendants would be on notice of potential litigation, and would not be
burdened by spurious claims. Such a policy would not shield alien or
foreign defendants from liability but would encourage both to prevent
the entry of defective goods into a state. This policy would permit a
forum state to hold either type of defendant liable. Finally, a uniform
jurisdictional standard preserves the sovereign status of foreign nations
and sister states. By adhering to the minimum contacts standard estab-
lished by the Supreme Court, state courts will not interfere with the
United States government's commercial relations with other nations.
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